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Introduction
In this paper, I study the e¤ect of reference pricing on competition by parallel imports, in particular the market share of parallel imports and the number of parallel traders.
Pharmaceutical parallel trade and reference pricing are both prevalent phenomena in the European Union 1 . The combination of regional exhaustion of intellectual property rights and Department of Economics, University of Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen, Germany, laura.birg@wiwi.uni-goettingen.de. I wish to thank Jürgen Rost and Roland Lederer at Insight Health for providing help and access to the data. 1 In the destination countries of parallel trade, the share of parallel imports in pharmacy market sales ranged between 7.9% in the United Kingdom, 10.3% in Germany, 10.6% in the Netherlands, 18 .7% in Sweden, and 25.2 % in Denmark (EFPIA, 2016) . the free movement of goods in the EU internal market enable parallel trade, implying that goods that were placed on the market in one country can be exported to another country without the authorization of the manufacturer (Maskus, 2000) . Considerable price di¤erence for pharmaceuticals between EU member states, which may be as high as 300%, make parallel trade pro…table (Kanavos & Costa-Font, 2005 ). In the EU, one source of price di¤erences for pharmaceuticals are regulatory di¤erences as a result of national competence in health policy (TFEU Art. 168).
A common form of pharmaceutical regulation, which is applied or has been applied by almost all EU member states, is reference pricing (Carone, Schwierz & Xavier, 2012) . Reference pricing de…nes a common reimbursement price for a group of interchangeable pharmaceuticals.
If consumers purchase a drug that is priced above the reference price, they have to pay the di¤erence between both prices out-of-pocket. Reference pricing intends to enhance price competition, thereby reducing drug prices and public health expenditure. Empirical evidence seems to con…rm the price-decreasing e¤ect of reference pricing. These results suggest that stricter regulation in destination countries of parallel imports may weaken competition from parallel imports.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is presented. Section 3 presents the data set and section 4 studies the e¤ect of reference prices on competition by parallel imports empirically. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Consider a (domestic) manufacturer M selling a drug b and n (identical) parallel traders selling the corresponding parallel import .
Consumers associate a lower quality with the parallel import, which is captured by a discount factor 2 (0; 1) in consumer valuation. This perception may result from di¤erences in appearance and packaging (Maskus, 2000) . Moreover, there is evidence that the price of a drug may serve as a quality indicator (Waber et al., 2008). Accordingly, due to a lower price, the parallel import may be associated with lower quality. (1 ) , with nq = Q . Production technologies exhibit constant marginal costs, which are normalized to zero for simplicity.
The structure of the model can be summarized by the following two-stage game: In the …rst stage, potential parallel traders simultaneously decide whether to enter the market at …xed cost of entry f . In the second stage, …rms compete in quantities.
Coinsurance
Consider a system with coinsurance as a benchmark. Copayments are given as c b = p b and
In the second stage, …rms maximize
Assuming symmetry, quantities are q b = 1+n n( +1)+2 and q = 1 n( +1)+2 . In the …rst stage, the number of parallel trader is determined by the zero-pro…t condition:
Equilibrium quantities are
Drug prices are
The market share of the parallel import is
Reference Pricing
Consider an exogenous reference price r with p b ; p > r. Copayments are given as c r b = r+p r b r and c r = r + p r r. Inverse demand is given as p r b = 1 + r (1 ) q b (1 ) Q and
In the second stage, …rms maximize b = x and i = x. Assuming symmetry, quantities
(n(1+ )+2) and q = 1 +r(1 )(1+ )
(1 )(n(1+ )+2) .
In the …rst stage, the number of parallel trader is determined by the zero-pro…t condition:
Proposition 1 summarizes the e¤ect of reference pricing on competition by parallel traders:
Proposition 1 An exogenous reference price r that is binding for both versions of the drug and su¢ciently high (r b r n , c r ) increases the number of parallel traders, i.e., n = n r n > 0, and increases the market share of the parallel import, i.e., = r > 0. The data set comprises monthly data on sales by pharmacies to consumers (in units and in Euro, at the pharmaceutical manufacturer price), sales by wholesalers to pharmacies (in units), returns from pharmacies to wholesalers (in units), pharmaceutical manufacturer price, pharmacy retail price, and reference price. 
Empirical Analysis
In order to identify the e¤ect of reference prices on the market share of parallel imports, I estimate the following …xed e¤ects model
where y it is the (log) market share of imported products (in packages or in turnover) or the number of importers in a market i in month t. RP it is either a dummy variable indicating that a reference price for market i at month t exists or it is the (log) reference price for market i in month t. X it contains a set of characteristics that vary over time (the market size measured in number of packages sold and the number of products in the same ATC3 group), i is a product …xed e¤ect, t is a month …xed e¤ect, and " it is the error term. In some markets, reference prices change within this time span. In these markets, I only use observations before the change in reference prices to focus on the e¤ect of the introduction of the reference price (and not on the change in reference prices).
Introduction of Reference Pricing
The main empirical results for the e¤ect of the introduction of the reference price on the market share of parallel imports are summarized in Table 2 . In this speci…cation, market size and market shares are measured in units. The dummy variable indicating the introduction of a reference price in a market a has a positive sign in all speci…cations of this estimation. The introduction of reference prices has a positive and quite substantial e¤ect. Since I use the natural logarithm of market shares in my estimations, the coe¢cient of the dummy is to be interpreted as semielasticity. The introduction of reference prices has increased the market share of parallel imports by 75% to 85%. Since all speci…cations include month …xed e¤ects, this is not a result of a time trend. Since I use only observations in markets where a reference price is introduced, the estimation result cannot be caused by the possibility that market shares for parallel imports are in general higher in markets where a reference price is introduced (compared to other markets).
The coe¢cient for the market size (measured by packages sold in each market in each month) has a negative sign. The market share of parallel imports seems to be lower in larger markets.
However, the estimated coe¢cient is not statistically signi…cant. The estimated coe¢cient for the number of products in the same ATC3-group is small and positive. However, it also is statistically not signi…cant.
The main empirical results for the e¤ect of the introduction of the reference price on the number of importers are summarized in Table 3 .
The dummy variable indicating the introduction of a reference price in a market has a positive sign in all speci…cations of this estimation. The introduction of reference prices has a positive and substantial e¤ect on the numbers of importers. The number of importers is measured in natural logarithms, the coe¢cient of the dummy captures the semielasticity. The introduction of reference prices has increased the number of importers on average by 50% to 54%. The market size (measured in units) has a small but positive e¤ect on the number of importers. However, the coe¢cient is not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The number of products in the same ATC3-group has a very small negative e¤ect, but is also not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Changes of Reference Prices
Reference prices change over time in many markets. The trend of decreasing reference prices increase the strictness of regulation and therefore may change the incentives for parallel importers to compete with local incumbents.
To analyze the e¤ect of changes in reference prices on the market share of parallel imports or the number of importers, I use only observations in each market beginning with the introduction of the reference price. This results in an unbalanced panel with di¤erent entry dates. Table 4 presents summary statistics for the sample in this sample. Table 5 summarizes the e¤ect of the magnitude of reference prices on the (log) market shares of imports.
The reference price and the market share are measured in natural logarithms. Therefore, the coe¢cient for the (log) reference price captures the elasticity. A decrease in the reference price by one percent decreases the market share of parallel imports by 1:1% to 1:4%. The estimated coe¢cient is statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at least at the …ve percent level in all speci…cations. This coe¢cient may be interpreted as the e¤ect of a change in the reference price. I employ product …xed e¤ects. Therefore, the coe¢cient for the reference price does not simply capture the di¤erence between markets with a high reference price compared to markets with a low reference price.
The market size decreases the market share of parallel imports with an elasticity of 0:7 to 0:79. The number of products in the same ATC3-group has a positive e¤ect on the market share of parallel imports. The estimated elasticity is 0:15. All controls are statistically signi…cant at the 0.1 percent level.
The results for the number of importers are shown in Table 6 .
A decrease in the reference price by one percent decreases the number of importers by 0:91% to 1:2%. The estimated coe¢cient is statistically signi…cant at the 0:1 percent level.
The market size has a small but negative impact on the number of importers. However, the Table 7 . The direction and the magnitude of the e¤ect of the introduction of reference prices is similar to the original estimation based on packages. The same holds for the estimated e¤ect of changes in the reference price on the market share of parallel imports as shown in Table 8 .
In the time span of the sample, the VAT rate for pharmaceuticals in Germany rose from 16% to 19%. Reference prices have been increased parallel to the VAT increase. To rule out the possibility that this has had an e¤ect on market shares, I have calculated reference prices net of VAT. The e¤ects of these net reference prices are identical to the real reference prices as shown in Table 9 for market shares and in Table 10 for the number of parallel importers.
If markets are de…ned only by active substance and dose strength, then less but larger markets are considered. Compared to the original estimations, the results change to a small extend.
Results for the e¤ect of the introduction of a reference price on market shares are shown in Table 11 . The sign of the estimated coe¢cient is still positive. The magnitude of the coe¢cient di¤ers from the original estimation. In the speci…cation without control variables (…rst column), the magnitude is slightly lower compared to the original estimation. In speci…cations that include control variables (second and third column), however, the magnitude of the coe¢cient is larger compared to the original estimation. The market size in this speci…cation has a positive e¤ect (compared to a negative e¤ect in the original estimation) on the market share of parallel imports.
With respect to the number of parallel importers the wider market de…nition does not change a lot. Size and signi…cance of the estimated coe¢cient for the dummy indicating the introduction of a reference price are similar to the original estimation.
In the wider market de…nition, the e¤ect of a change in the reference price on market shares of parallel imports is much higher in magnitude compared to the original estimation. But still, the direction of the e¤ect remains the same. Also the e¤ect of a change in reference prices on the number of importers is stronger for the wider market de…nition. Irrespective of which market de…nition is considered to be the better one, the main results of the theoretical model are con…rmed by the estimations.
Conclusion
In this paper I have studied the e¤ect of the reference pricing on competition by parallel imports, in particular the market share of parallel imports and the number of parallel traders. First, I
have analyzed the e¤ect of reference pricing on competition by parallel imports in a vertical di¤erentiation model with a locally sourced version and a parallel import o¤ered by n identical parallel traders. Second, I have explored the e¤ect of reference pricing on competition by parallel imports using a data set with prescription drugs with competition from parallel imports. Both the model and estimation results suggest that decrease in the reference price decreases the market share of the parallel import and the number of parallel traders.
These results suggest that stricter regulation in destination countries of parallel imports may weaken competition from parallel imports. Policy makers face a trade o¤ between reducing drug price by lowering reference prices and promoting competition by parallel imports.
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